The Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) protocol is being included in a growing number of connected objects such as fitness trackers and headphones. As part of the service discovery mechanism of BLE, devices announce themselves by broadcasting radio signals called advertisement packets that can be collected with off-the-shelf hardware and software. To avoid the risk of tracking based on those messages, BLE features an address randomization mechanism that substitutes the device address with random temporary pseudonyms, called Private addresses.
INTRODUCTION
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) is a 2.4 GHz ISM radio communication standard developed by the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG). Compared to Bluetooth, BLE provides a reduced power consumption while maintaining a similar communication range that makes it suitable for devices with low energy resources such as fitness trackers, headphones, etc. According to the Bluetooth SIG, more than 2 billion devices supporting BLE have been shipped in 2018 [25] .
While wireless technologies such as Bluetooth/BLE or Wi-Fi bring hands-on facilities, they also have the potential to expose users to physical tracking because of the identifiers found within the radio signals emitted by their devices [8, 10, 27] . To protect users against this threat, the LE Privacy [24, Vol 3, Part C, sec. 10 .7] feature defines the use of temporary link layer identifiers that periodically change for a random value. However, it has been shown [7, 8] that some information can still leak from BLE devices.
As other wireless technologies, BLE features a discovery mechanism called advertisement [24, Vol 3, Part C, sec. 11]. To enable this mechanism, devices periodically broadcast advertisement packets that are populated with a variety of information announcing their characteristics and available services. Those packets are transmitted in clear, opening new possibilities for passively tracking users in the physical world [11, 20] .
In this paper, we present an analysis of the privacy provisions provided by the LE Privacy feature as well as its limitations. Our study is based on a dataset of real-world observations of BLE advertisement traffic containing about 8 million packets associated to more than 53500 different device addresses collected over a period of 5 months.
Our contributions are threefold:
• We analyze the deployment of the address randomization mechanism in the wild. In particular, we found that the LE Privacy feature is largely adopted and that most implementations follow the specifications. However, we also found that a significant fraction of devices are not exhibiting those properties, exposing their users to tracking; • We show that the content of advertisement packets can undermine the protections provided by the LE Privacy feature. Indeed, we found that some devices include unique identifiers and counters that are not reset upon an address change. We also identified fields containing temporary identifiers, but for which the renewal is not done at the same time as the random address change; • We identify that advertisement packets include data that can reveal the manufacturer, the model and the type of the device, exposing the user to inventory attacks and inference of sensitive attributes. For instance, some medical devices are broadcasting their types (hearing aid, glucometer, insulin pen, etc.) trivially exposing a medical condition of the owner.
The paper is organized as follows. First, a BLE background is provided in Section 2. Then, Section 3 defines our experimental methodology. We present observations on our dataset in Section 4. Section 5 gives a detailed inspection of the BLE device address randomization mechanism and we show how it can be defeated in Section 6. Section 7 shows the additional information leaked by the advertising data. Finally, we highlight the related work in Section 8 and Section 9 concludes the paper.
BACKGROUND 2.1 BLE protocol
BLE has been introduced in 2010 as part of the Bluetooth Core Specification version 4.0 [22, Vol 6] . In this protocol, 3 channels are dedicated to the discovery mechanism called advertisement while the 37 remaining channels are used for data exchanges between two connected devices.
A BLE device can endorse two main roles, Peripheral and Central, following a client-server model. A Peripheral device periodically broadcasts advertisement packets and, if connectable, accepts incoming connection requests from Central. A Central device listens to advertisement packets and, when applicable, initiates a connection with a Peripheral. Note that, a BLE device cannot endorse both roles at the same time.
At the physical layer [24, Vol 6, Part B, sec. 2.1], BLE packets are split into 4 fields: the Preamble, the Access Address, the Protocol Data Unit (PDU) and the Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC). In the case of advertisement packets, the Access Address shall be set to 0x8e89bed6 [24, Vol 6, Part B, sec. 2.1.2]. The PDU itself is divided into two sections: a 2-byte header and a variable size payload. The header describes the type of the PDU and the class of the BLE device address (Public or random). The payload part contains the device address followed by the advertising data.
Device addressing
During communications, devices are identified by a Bluetooth device address (BD_ADDR), a 48-bit identifier found within the Advertising Address (AdvA) field of the advertising payload. As part of the LE Privacy feature, BLE supports 3 types of random addresses in addition to the globally unique MAC address (Public): 
BLE advertisement
Advertisement is the name of the BLE discovery mechanism that allows Central devices to discover Peripherals in range prior to set up a connection. It is used to broadcast connectionless data such as device characteristics and supported services, but also data coming from services and custom applications. In addition to the frame header, advertisement packets can contain up to 31 bytes of cleartext data that can be collected and processed by any BLE device in range. Moreover, Central devices can query a Peripheral by sending a directed scan request that triggers back a scan response. The content of a scan response follows the same format as advertisement packets but will include different elements of information.
The advertising payload consists of the AdvA field (equal to the BD_ADDR of the Peripheral) followed by a sequence of one or more Advertising Data (AD) structures used to carry items of information. An AD structure is composed of a 1-byte field indicating the length of the AD structure (excluding itself), followed by a 1-byte field specifying the type 1 of the AD and finally, a sequence of up to 29 bytes of cleartext data (see Figure 1 ). A subset of common AD types is presented in Table 2 .
METHODOLOGY 3.1 Data collection protocol
This work is based on a dataset of advertisement packets and scan responses that have been collected over 5 months by the authors during commute, work and leisure times. To collect the data, we used a Raspberry Pi single-board computer equipped with a CSR v4.0 Bluetooth USB dongle. In order to collect advertisement packets on BLE advertising channels, we developed a C software based on BlueZ libraries, the official Linux Bluetooth stack. Furthermore, as advertising data can be obtained from both advertisement packets and scan responses (see Section 2.3), we designed our C software to collect advertisement packets and automatically send scan requests to obtain potential scan responses from discovered Peripherals.
Structure of the data
Our dataset contains a set of records, each record corresponding to an advertising frame (advertisement packet or scan response). A record includes a timestamp along with a header and a payload. The data obtained from the data collection are stored as raw records that are organized as follows:
• Metadata: timestamp;
• Advertising PDU header: PDU type, BD_ADDR type, length of the advertising payload; • Advertising payload: BD_ADDR, advertising data;
The advertising payload of each record is then parsed to extract AD structures and their various fields. To perform this task, we implemented our own Python parser based on online official Bluetooth SIG resources. The resulting data are then stored in a relational database comprising 179 attributes corresponding to the metadata, fields of the header and parsed AD structures.
Dataset preprocessing
Before performing our study, the dataset went through steps of anonymization and sanitization to minimize the privacy risks associated with the collected data and remove unwanted records.
Dataset anonymization. We focused on attributes corresponding to identifiers (Stable device addresses, device names, etc.) and on temporal data (timestamps). The following transformations were applied:
• Device addresses: the Stable BD_ADDR (Public and Random Static) have been pseudonymized through keyed-hashing 2 of the 24-bit lowest part (NIC), thus leaving the 24-bit highest part (OUI) unmodified. • Names of persons: fields potentially containing names were sanitized by searching and removing substrings that were matching the pattern of a name ("*.'s .*|*. 's .*", "*. de .*") or strings from a dictionary 3 of names. Among the 1300 distinct device names of our dataset, we identified and redacted 142 names related to physical persons from 4287 advertisement records accounting for 0.05% of the dataset. • Timestamps: the temporal information has been transformed from absolute (date and time) to relative (time elapsed since the beginning of the collection campaign). Nevertheless, in order to be able to conduct the analysis of the distribution of addresses (Section 5.2), we kept the list of raw Random Static addresses that were stripped from any other information.
Dataset sanitization. BLE beacons are static devices deployed in the physical space to enable localization services. Thus, they are of little interest in the context of this study as they are not associated to an individual. The records associated to beacons have been filtered out the dataset based on regular expressions used to identify the main beacons standards 4 . Using this approach, we identified and removed a total of 50439 advertisement records accounting for 0.63% of our original dataset. In addition to the sanitization of beacons, we also removed all the records that have at least one malformed 5 AD structure leading to the suppression of 1958 additional advertisement records representing 0.02% of our original dataset.
OBSERVATIONS ON THE DATASET
In this section, we present observations on the dataset used in this study. This dataset, collected over 5 months, contains about 8 million records and includes more than 53500 distinct BD_ADDR. Note that, since some of those addresses are random pseudonyms, the number of actual devices is expected to be smaller than the number of distinct device addresses.
Adoption of the LE Privacy feature
As described in Section 2.2, device addresses can be of 4 types: Public, Random Static (Stable category), Random Non-resolvable and Random Resolvable (Private category). Table 1 shows the distribution of BD_ADDR and records among the device address types in our dataset.
In term of volume, we observed that Private addresses (Random Resolvable and Random Non-resolvable) account for about 60% of the advertisement packets found in our dataset. This shows that the privacy-preserving mechanism of BLE is widely adopted by the industry. This also highlights that a number of devices are still using Stable addresses. In fact, our dataset includes more than 5500 Stable device addresses that can be trivially used to track the corresponding users [7, 8, 11] . Moreover, we observed that 80% of those Stable identifiers are of type Public, thus revealing the globally unique MAC address assigned by the manufacturer to the device. Among the Private category, we computed that a large part of advertisement packets belongs to the Random Resolvable type (4M packets) representing more than 84% of the traffic generated by Private addresses. This suggests that the resolvable feature of LE Privacy is being endorsed by vendors over the non-resolvable option.
Manufacturers OUI distribution
By definition, for device addresses falling in the Public type, it is possible to identify the manufacturer via the OUI (Organizationally Unique Identifier) of the address. The distribution of the top 10 OUI found within Public addresses is presented in Figure 2 . We can observe the prevalence of 4 companies producing electronic devices (Samsung, Apple, Bose and Logitech) along with a chipset manufacturer (Texas Instruments). As they configure their products to use Public addresses, those companies are exposing their customers to tracking.
AD types distribution
Advertising data can contain a variety of AD types. In our dataset, we found that advertising payloads contain 2 distinct AD structures in average. The distribution of those AD types is highly concentrated as the six most common types (presented in Table 2 ) that are included in more than 80% of the advertisement packets in our dataset. Indeed, we computed that 6.3M advertisement records include at least one of those six types.
Among those most common values, we can observe types used to identify (Complete Local Name) or to describe the device and its capabilities (Appearance and Flags). Other types are dedicated to the advertisement of services (Complete List of 16-bit Service Class UUIDs) and transmission of data (Manufacturer Specific Data and Service Data-16-bit UUID).
Also, we can observe that the distribution of those AD types varies according to the address type. For instance, the Complete Local Name type, which is respectively found in 36.2% and 82.2% of Public and Random Static addresses, is less observed with Private addresses, which makes sense as those devices are supposed to remain anonymous. 
DEVICE ADDRESS RANDOMIZATION SCHEME ANALYSIS
In this section, we leverage our dataset to analyze current implementations of the LE Privacy feature, and more particularly the lifetime and the uniform distribution of the random addresses.
Lifetimes of device addresses
The Bluetooth Core Specification [24, Vol 6, Part B, sec. 6.1] recommends a maximum duration of 15 minutes for both Random Resolvable and Random Non-resolvable addresses to prevent tracking. On the opposite, Random Static (the third type of random addresses) and Public addresses are not supposed to change and are thus expected to be used for an extended duration. Due to our method of data collection, the duration for which a device stays in range during the collection cannot be controlled nor measured. As a consequence, lifetimes measured here should be considered as a conservative estimation. Indeed, a device may continue to use its BD_ADDR after it goes out of our collecting device range. We computed the lifetime of each device address and Figure 3 presents the cumulative distribution of those lifetimes for the 4 types of BD_ADDR. First, we can observe that 41% of Public and 17% of Random Static BD_ADDR have a lifetime of more than 3 hours. The very short lifetime of the remaining Stable addresses is likely due to the fact that the device was only observed during a single and short period of time. On the other hand, we can observe that a vast majority of Private addresses have a very short lifetime as 89% of Random Resolvable and 96% of Random Non-resolvable addresses are observed for a duration below 1 second. We can also observe that 6% of Random Resolvable and 4% of Random Non-resolvable addresses have a lifetime larger than 15 minutes. Some Private addresses have even been observed for more than 69 days.
Those observations show that the recommendation of the lifetime of a device address is enforced by most implementations. However, some implementations of Private addresses are not following the specifications, keeping the same address for an extended duration and thus exposing the users to tracking.
Uniformity of random addresses distribution
According to the Bluetooth Core Specification [24, Vol 2, Part H, sec. 2], random addresses should be generated using a FIPS compliant PRNG and thus should exhibit some characteristics expected from those PRNGs. In particular, it is expected that the output of those PRNGs follows a uniform distribution. We used the random addresses found within our dataset and tested whether this set of random values followed a uniform distribution 6 . For each random address found within our dataset, we extracted the part that has been generated with a PRNG 7 and submitted those values to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistical test [5] . The KS test is used to test whether one distribution of values differs substantially from theoretical expectations. It outputs the distance (the statistic) between the empirical distribution and the reference distribution as well as a significance score (the p-value) that gives the probability of obtaining this distance if the values were drawn from the reference distribution [13] . The null hypothesis is rejected when the p-value is below a certain threshold (values of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 are typically used). 6 Since those random values have been produced by different instances and implementations, it is thus not possible to test most of the properties required by FIPS. 7 Not all the bits of random BD_ADDR are supposed to be random. First, the 2 most significant bits are fixed to specify the type of the random address and are thus not random. Then, for Random Non-resolvable and Random Static addresses, the 46 remaining bits are random. Actually, for the Random Resolvable addresses, only 22 bits are random because the 24 least significant bits are computed from the random part prand and the IRK (see Section 2.2). This test was run on each type of random addresses and produced the results reported in Table 3 . The p-values obtained for Random Resolvable and Random Non-resolvable addresses are high (> 0.15) while the p-value for Random Static is very small (< 10 −5 ). This means that the hypothesis that BD_ADDR are uniformly generated can be rejected for the Random Static addresses and kept for both Random Resolvable and Random Non-resolvable addresses. The non-uniform distribution of Random Static addresses can be clearly observed on Figure 4 that shows that some ranges of values are more common than others. In fact, we have identified that some categories of devices are using specific values for the higher part of the device address (the leftmost 24 bits). For instance, Sony SRS portable speakers and Samsung Gear smartwatches respectively use c7:d5:0b (13 devices) and dc:c1:c6 (10 devices) as a prefix. This suggests that some Random Static addresses are allocated by range, the same way MAC addresses are allocated by OUI, potentially revealing information on the type and the manufacturer of the device (see Section 7) .
Although the set of Random Non-resolvable and Random Resolvable addresses appear to be uniformly distributed, this does not guarantee that all those addresses are generated with a FIPS compliant PRNG, and that there are no other flaws in the generation of those random addresses.
DEFEATING DEVICE ADDRESS RANDOMIZATION
According to the results of the previous section, it appears that globally, implementations of the address randomization scheme avoid common pitfalls. However, we will show in the following that data included in the rest of the advertising payload can contain information that could negate the protection provided by the address randomization.
Attacker model
In this section, we consider an external attacker which continuously monitors the traffic on BLE advertising channels. This attacker is thus able to capture the advertisement packets generated by BLE devices in range. Furthermore, we assume that the attacker is passive: he only captures traffic and does not interact with the wireless channel through injection or jamming.
5b:eb:b9:c5:f4:ee 6c:dc:32:08:38:04 5f:c6:5c:25:b7:5a 06ffe01242fda5 06ffe01242fda5 06ffe01242fda5 Figure 5 : Representation of a successful attack. The BLE device is randomizing its BD_ADDR (in italic) over time while keeping a static identifier (in bold) in the advertising data. Such a 5-byte identifier can be used by a passive attacker to link together the packets generated with the three different BD_ADDR.
On the victim side, we only make the assumption that his device has its Bluetooth interface turned on and broadcasts advertisement packets.
The goal of the attacker is to track a device beyond the address randomization scheme based on the captured advertising traffic. More specifically, a successful attack is defined as the attacker being able to link two sets of advertisement packets generated by a single device but with two distinct BD_ADDR. Consequently, a successful attack links together two pseudonyms of a device. Figure 5 shows an example where a device generates traffic with three different BD_ADDR, but it is possible to link together the three sets of advertisement packets based on a static identifier found within the advertising data.
Static advertising identifiers
6.2.1 Device names. Complete Local Name and Shortened Local Name are two AD types that are respectively used to advertise a complete and a shortened version of local names assigned to devices. From our dataset, we found that more than 1.7% of Random Resolvable and 0.06% of Random Non-resolvable addresses include either a Complete Local Name or a Shortened Local Name AD structure in their advertising payloads.
Moreover, we discovered that a number of device names advertised over Private addresses include a part corresponding to a unique identifier. For instance, device names of Xiaomi Amazfit fitness trackers match the following pattern Amazfit-XXXX, where XXXX are hexadecimal digits. We have identified several other families of devices such as Boosted Boards skateboards and Nokia/Withings smartwatches that also include an identifier in their device names. In practice, the size of such an identifier varies from 1 to 4 bytes and could be used to track the device over time.
From our observations on the Public addresses, we found that the identifier included in the device name is often the lowest part of the device address. This suggests that, for devices using Private addresses, the digital identifiers found within the device names could be a part of the device Public BD_ADDR. In this context, a UUID is tailored to identify a service rather than a device. However, we found that some 128-bit UUIDs are customized by manufacturers to include a complete Public address in the least significant bits (LSB), thus forming a device unique identifier. We found a total of 180 distinct UUIDs within advertisement packets using Private addresses. Leveraging the registered OUI of the included Public addresses along with the advertised device names, we found that (1) some of those UUIDs belong to the Nokia/Withings manufacturer and (2) they are broadcasted by Steel smartwatches (9 devices). This practice introduces a secondary unique identifier that can be used to track the device over time.
LE Bluetooth Device
Address. The LE Bluetooth Device Address [23, Part A, sec. 1.16] AD type can be used by a Peripheral to broadcast a local device address and its class (Public or random). Nevertheless, the Bluetooth Core Specification [23, Part A, sec. 1] requires not to include such an AD structure in the advertising data. Especially, this is important for devices that use random BD_ADDR. However, we discovered that a number of devices using random addresses are including this AD structure in their advertising data and expose their Public device addresses. Leveraging the OUI of those advertised addresses, we found out that manufacturers such as LG Innotek and Arcadyan expose their Public BD_ADDR this way.
Proximity protocols
In advertisement packets, AD structures such as the Manufacturer Specific Data and the Service Data-16-bit UUID structures can be used to carry application specific data. In the following, we focus on two prevalent proximity protocols found within advertisement packets and discuss on the fact that their broadcasted data can expose information that can reduce or even negate the address randomization mechanism. Counter. The counter is a 2-byte integer incremented over time, but that can remain unchanged in several consecutive advertisement packets. We found that this counter is not reset when the BD_ADDR changes in the randomization scheme (see Figure 7 ). This means that based on this counter, it is possible to link different addresses belonging to the same device, as it has been shown with 802.11 probe requests frames [26] .
Apple Nearby Identifier. According to the Apple iOS 12.3 security guide [2], the Apple Nearby Identifier is used for the mutual identification of devices linked to the same Apple iCloud account.
To prevent tracking based on this identifier, the Apple Nearby protocol periodically generates a new identifier every time the BD_ADDR is changed. However, based on our observations on an Apple iPhone 6 and an Apple iPhone 8 smartphone, the change of the Apple Nearby Identifier is not completely synchronized with the change of BD_ADDR: for a short duration after the BD_ADDR change, the old Apple Nearby Identifier is used with the new device address (see Figure 7 ). This means that based on the Apple Nearby Identifier, it is possible to link two BD_ADDR used by the same device.
In our dataset, we found that among the 31000 Private addresses that include an Apple Manufacturer Specific Data AD structure, more than 79% of them include an Apple Nearby Identifier field.
Microsoft Connected Devices Platform (CDP). The Microsoft
CDP [19] protocol provides a discovery system for Microsoft devices to authenticate and verify themselves as well as a way to exchange data. Similarly to the Apple Handoff protocol, data of Microsoft CDP are carried by the Manufacturer Specific Data AD structure. Based on the Microsoft CDP [19] specifications along with empirical observations on advertisement packets, we have identified the format of the Microsoft CDP structure (see Figure 8 ). In particular, it includes an identifier that is derived from a salted hashing of the unique device identifier [19, sec. 2 
.2.2.2.3].
Using a BLE-enabled laptop running Microsoft Windows 10 left idled, we found that the lifetime of the BD_ADDR is around 16 minutes while the Device Hash lasts for approximately 60 minutes (see Figure 9 ). First, we can observe that Random Non-resolvable addresses used to advertise Microsoft CDP data last longer than the Bluetooth Core Specification recommended duration of 15 minutes. Then, the switch to a new Device Hash is not synchronized with the change of BD_ADDR. In fact, the Microsoft CDP advertising data undermine the address randomization scheme through the exposure of an identifier whose lifetime overlaps the one of the BD_ADDR.
From the dataset, we computed that more than 89% of Random Non-resolvable addresses follow the format of the data shown in Figure 8 . Leveraging the Device Type field found within the Microsoft CDP data (see Figure 8 ), we found that 96% of such Random Nonresolvable addresses are broadcasted from Microsoft Windows 10 computers (desktops and laptops). This suggests that a large fraction of the BLE-enabled Microsoft devices are in fact trackable, despite the use of address randomization. In addition, it appears that most BLE-enabled Microsoft Windows 10 computers are affected by this issue as we found that CDPUserSvc, the service responsible for the broadcast of those Microsoft CDP messages, is enabled by default.
INFERRING INFORMATION FROM ADVERTISING DATA
Advertising data include information that can cause privacy threats beyond tracking. Indeed, we found that the characteristics of a device such as its manufacturer, model or type can be inferred. Those elements of information can become a privacy threat in the context of inventory attacks and profiling [9] , where an attacker will try to infer information based on the device carried by the user. For instance, a medical device can reveal a medical condition and profiling individuals based on their devices is a direction taken by some companies [28] . This section presents a review of the information that can be inferred from advertising data. Our findings are summarized in Table 4 .
Device model and manufacturer
Public BD_ADDR. The Public device address is an identifier that can be exposed in the AdvA field of the advertising payload or in [17] and could be reproduced with BLE Public BD_ADDR. As shown in Section 5.2, some Random Static addresses also appear to be allocated by range. In those cases, the device model could be also inferred from the Random Static address.
Device names. As human friendly descriptors, the Complete Local Name and Shortened Local Name AD structures often include identifiers of manufacturers and models of devices. As a result, those structures are two other sources of information that can be used to deduce the manufacturer.
For instance, we identified that devices including patterns such as LE-Bose and Jabra in their device names are respectively Bose and Jabra manufactured headsets. In addition, we found that devices such as Garmin fitness trackers and Bang&Olufsen headphones include the name of their models in their device names.
Company IDs and service UUIDs. Advertising data can include several identifiers tight to companies. For instance, this is the case of the company IDs 9 that are included in the Manufacturer Specific Data AD structure. Like company IDs, members UUIDs 10 are 16-bit identifiers assigned by the Bluetooth SIG. Such members UUIDs can be included in the Service Data-16-bit UUID and Complete List of 16-bit Service Class UUIDs AD structures. The presence of those indicators suggests that the device features a service that has been designed by the corresponding company. Indeed, for the sake of compatibility, it is possible that a service is implemented by other companies than the one that has designed it. However, we found that, in practice, those identifiers are generally included by devices of the associated manufacturer.
In addition, some companies can design their own 16-bit UUIDs. This information is not publicly available but can be obtained analyzing the advertisement traffic generated by the devices. Similarly, the 128-bit service UUIDs can be generated by manufacturers and can be leveraged as well. For instance, the adab09ad-6e7d-4601-bda2-bffaa68956ba custom 128-bit service UUID broadcasted by Fitbit fitness trackers is associated with the Fitbit manufacturer.
From our dataset, we computed that more than 78% of Stable and 95% of Private addresses are associated with at least one company identifier (company ID or members UUID) in the advertising payload, indicating that the manufacturer could be identified.
Device type
Public BD_ADDR:. As previously observed, the manufacturer of a device can be derived from its Public BD_ADDR. Nevertheless, when this manufacturer is focused on a single class of products, it becomes possible to infer the type of the device from the Public address. For instance, the OUI associated with Nintendo and OculusVR respectively reveal a video game platform and a virtual reality headset.
Service UUIDs. Service UUIDs are processed by Central to discover services offered by nearby Peripheral before establishing a connection. Some service UUIDs assigned by the Bluetooth SIG reveal particular characteristics of a device that can lead to the inference of its type. For instance, looking at the online Bluetooth SIG database 11 of 16-bit service UUIDs, we can infer that devices which broadcast the Running Speed and Cadence service UUID (0x1814) are likely fitness trackers while those that advertise the Insulin Delivery service UUID (0x183a) are healthcare devices.
In addition, as mentioned in Section 7.1, a custom 128-bit service UUID can disclose attributes of a device such as its manufacturer or its model that could lead to an implicit identification of its type. For instance, the aa745be2-9025-4bf2a318-91f3dba2999f 128-bit service UUID is associated with Garmin Nuvi GPS while 0000de00-3dd4-4255-8d62-6dc7b9bd5561 is advertised by Nikon cameras. Nevertheless, even though those service UUIDs are customized by the manufacturers, we discovered that some of them are hardcoded in open-source specifications and codes. This is especially the case with the Google hearing aid 12 specifications and the Sony SmartBand SWR-10 13 open API. Therefore, such online resources can be also leveraged to identify the type of a device.
Manufacturer Specific Data. The data carried by the Manufacturer Specific Data AD structure can include fields indicating the type of the device. Indeed, this is the case of Garmin (company ID 0x0087), for which the 16 MSB of data disclose the model of the device: 0x0657 and 0x0802 respectively indicate Garmin Forerunner 620 and Garmin Fenix 3 fitness smartwatches. Similarly, for Apple (company ID 0x004c), the 8 MSB of data expose the type of the device: 0x07 and 0x0b respectively disclose Apple AirPods earphones and Apple Watch smartwatches. We also discovered that other experimental results 14 support and confirm some of our observations.
Moreover, we found that the Microsoft CDP proximity protocol includes a Device Type field (see Figure 8 ) that provides information on the nature of the device. As a consequence, when the value of this field is filled accordingly to the Microsoft CDP specifications [19, sec. 2.2.2.2.3], we can infer the type of the advertising device by lookup in the specifications: Xbox One (0x01), Windows 10 Desktop (0x09), Windows 10 Phone (0x0b), etc.
Appearance and Class of Device. The Bluetooth Core Specification defines two AD types, Appearance 15 and Class of Device 16 , that are designed to carry information about the nature of a device and more specifically its external appearance. For instance, the Appearance code 0x00c1 disclose a sport watch, while the Class of Device code 0x022808 indicates a toy vehicle. More worrisome, certain codes indicate specific medical devices: Appearance codes such as 0x0d00 and 0x0d48 respectively betray a glucose monitor and an insulin pen, while Class of Device codes such as 0x02292c and 0x022930 respectively denote a medication monitor system and a knee prosthesis.
In our dataset, we found that more than 5.3% of Public and 13.3% of Random Static addresses include either an Appearance or a Class of Device AD structure in their advertising data. Also, for Private addresses, only 0.01% of Random Resolvable BD_ADDR broadcast data carried by the Appearance AD structure while the Class of Device type is not advertised. Among the most common appearances and class of devices, we found that devices such as Tile iTag keyrings, Giant RideSense cycling sensors and Diggro ID10x heart rate belts explicitly advertise their external appearances allowing a passive observer to infer the type of the device based on those information.
Identity of the owner
The Complete Local Name and Shortened Local Name AD structures carry a textual description of the device that can be often customized by users. As a result, a number of those device names include the identity of the owner under the form of a full name, a firstname, a lastname or a nickname. For instance, we found that Bose headsets and Apple smartphones broadcast such device names that include the name of the owner: LE-Bose Alice and Bob's iPhone. During our dataset anonymization process (see Section 3.3), we identified and subsequently anonymized a total of 10.9% of the 1300 distinct device names advertised from 0.4% of the addresses of the dataset.
RELATED WORK
Exposure of personal information through wireless networks have been the subject of numerous works. For instance, it has been highlighted that 802.11 local service discovery exposes identifying information [21] , relationships [21] and social links [6] . Most importantly, link layer identifiers such as MAC addresses can be used to track users in the physical world [4, 10] .
Several works have focused on the privacy aspects of BLE. Das et al. demonstrated [7] how the BLE traffic generated by a fitness wristband can be leveraged to infer the activity of its owner.
In BLEB [11] , the authors introduced a BLE botnet of smartphones for wide scale tracking and highlighted that BLE privacy features are not used by some wearable devices. Fawaz et al. introduced BLE-Guardian [8] , a solution to protect BLE users from privacy threats. In addition, they discussed several privacy issues of BLE advertisement, some of which are analyzed in detail in our paper. In particular, they noted that some manufacturers do not use random addresses, and that some of the temporary identifiers are used for long periods of time. We consolidate those observations by providing an updated and detailed review of those issues and identifying new privacy concerns such as those introduced by the proximity protocols.
Recently, Becker et al. demonstrated [3] that the LE Privacy feature can be defeated leveraging the advertising payload. We complement this work by deeply investigating the device address randomization scheme not limiting us to empirical observations. Moreover, based on our large-scale measurement, we are able to provide insights on the current adoption and implementations of the LE Privacy feature in the wild. Finally, we go beyond tracking concerns showing how advertising data can leak private information.
Martin et al. showed [17] that the MAC address of 802.11 devices can reveal the type of the device in addition of its manufacturer. Our study shows that the BLE advertising payload can be used to this aim.
In their blog posts [14, 15] , Lester and Stone pointed out that some elements contained in BLE advertisement packets can be leveraged to identify the nature of the device. We complement those observations presenting a comprehensive analysis of the AD structures that can expose the model and the type of a device.
Several tools for parsing the content of BLE advertising data have been produced by the community. In particular, the advlib [12] JavaScript library and the RaMBLE [14] Android mobile application are capable of decomposing and interpreting a number of AD structures. Our Python parser consolidates the features of those contributions and add several elements such as the decomposition of 128-bit UUIDs, manufacturer specific data and service data, to name a few.
To reduce the risk of user tracking, several approaches have been proposed such as the use of temporary identifiers [10] and protocols based on cryptographic primitives [21, 27] .
Use of disposable link layer identifiers [10] have been progressively adopted by the industry [26] . However, several works [16, 26] have shown the limitation of MAC address randomization in the context of 802.11. Vanhoef et al. [26] and Martin et al. [16] showed that MAC randomization can be defeated thanks to the data contained in the body of the frame. Several of the issues affecting BLE and discussed in our paper, such as non-reset counters and static identifiers, were also found in 802.11 by those works [16, 26] . Finally, timing of frames has been also considered as a way to defeat 802.11 address randomization [18] .
CONCLUSION
This study presented a detailed analysis of the privacy provisions and issues in current implementations of the BLE advertising mechanism. First, we found that even if address randomization is widely adopted by vendors, a number of devices still use Stable addresses, exposing their owners to tracking. Furthermore, we found that this randomization scheme is not always correctly implemented as some devices exceed the recommended maximum duration of the random addresses. We also identified that, despite the use of a random device address, the content of the advertisement packets can be used to track users. Indeed, the address randomization scheme can be rendered useless by counters and static identifiers included by some devices in their advertising data. In particular, we found that custom data included in proximity protocols of Apple and Microsoft can be leveraged to defeat the randomization scheme. Finally, we showed how the advertising data can be mined to infer the nature of a BLE device, exposing the owner to further privacy threats such as inventory attacks and profiling.
We informed the manufacturers of the privacy issues identified in this paper 17 .
A part of the issues presented in this paper are the results of manufacturers that do not follow the BLE specifications. For instance, the inclusion of the LE Bluetooth Device Address AD structure in advertising data is clearly against the specifications. Nevertheless, most of the issues are the results of practices that are not forbidden by the specifications. For instance, using a custom UUID that includes a device address is compliant with the specifications. Similarly, there are no instructions on the nature of the information that can be carried by the Manufacturer Specific Data and Service Data AD structures. In fact, the BLE specifications do not provide any guidelines about the content of the advertising payload with regard to the privacy implications.
Currently, the privacy considerations of the BLE specifications are limited to the management of random link layer identifiers. However, as we showed in this paper, other elements of the advertising mechanism can be used to breach privacy. Thus, it is important to complement the specifications with additional requirements that would cover privacy issues such as those discussed in this paper.
